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Since their advent in 2001, virtual power plant (VPP) auctions have been implemented widely. In this
paper, we describe the simultaneous ascending-clock auction format that has been used for virtually all
VPP auctions to date, elaborating on other design choices that most VPP auctions have had in common as
well as discussing a few aspects that have varied signiﬁcantly among VPP auctions. We then evaluate the
various objectives of regulators in requiring VPP auctions, concluding that the auctions have been
effective devices for facilitating new entry into electricity markets and for developing wholesale power
markets.
  2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Virtual power plant auctions are sales of electricity capacity
which, rather than “physical” divestitures, are “virtual” divestitures
by one or more dominant ﬁrms in a market. Instead of selling the
physical power plant, the ﬁrm retains management and control of
the plant, but offers contracts that are intended to replicate the
output of the plant. Typically, these contracts are sold as divisible
goods of varying durations, offered in periodic open and trans-
parent auctions.
The motivation for and structure of a virtual power plant (VPP)
auction is easiest seen by examining the Electricité de France (EDF)
Generation Capacity Auctions, theworld’s ﬁrst and longest-running
series of VPPauctions.TheEDFauctionsbeganin 2001 aspartof the
regulatory quid pro quo for permitting EDF, the dominant electric
utility in France, to proceed with the acquisition of a joint
controlling stake in Energie Baden-Württemberg AG (EnBW), the
fourth largest electric utility in Germany. The European Commis-
sion(EC) noted that EDF wouldbe gaining joint control of one of the
potential competitors particularly well placed to enter the French
market, and the EC wishedtorequireEDF tomake available to other
potential entrants a signiﬁcant quantity of generating capacity in
France. At the same time, given EDF’s status as the largest nuclear
producer in the world, the regulator recognized that physical
divestment by EDF of its base-load nuclear plants would be unde-
sirable in several respects. In particular, EDF had demonstrated
a strong track record in the safety and security of its nuclear plants,
and the public clearly beneﬁted from economies of scale in EDF’s
management of nuclear plants. Consequently, the Undertaking
agreed by the regulator and EDF in early 2001 provided for a virtual
divestment by EDF of 6 GHz of French electricity capacity.
The VPP contracts offered in the EDF auctions are divided into
two groups: base-load products and peak-load products. Each VPP
product is an option contract for energy whose strike price
approximates the variable cost of the respective energy. (For
example, in the December 2009 auction, the strike prices of the
base-load and peak-load VPP products were 10 V/MWh and 53
V/MWh, respectively.) As such, the base-load product is exercised
essentially 24/7, whereas the peak-load product is exercised only
a fraction of the time. Approximately 80% of the electricity capacity
isofferedasbase-load products and approximately20% isofferedas
peak-load products.
1 Within each of the two groups, a variety of
durations would be offered: 3 months, 6 months, 12 months, 24
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1 In the early EDF Generation Capacity Auctions, there were actually three
product groups: base-load VPP products; peak-load VPP products; and Power
Purchase Agreement (PPA) products. The intentionwas for a total of 4000 MW to be
offered of base-load VPP,1000 MW to be offered of peak-load VPP, and 1000 MW to
be offered of PPA. The PPA product was essentially a ﬁrm base-load product from
November to March. Experience showed that the market had only limited demand
for the PPA product. The parties eventually agreed to reconﬁgure the auctions so as
to replace the 1000 MW of PPA product with 400 MW of VPP product. Thus, in the
recent EDF auctions, the total quantity offered has been 4400 MW of base-load VPP
product and 1000 MW of peak-load VPP product.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Utilities Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jup
0957-1787/$ e see front matter   2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jup.2010.05.002
Utilities Policy 18 (2010) 201e208Author's personal copy
months and 36 months; all with the same starting date.2 The
principle followed for clearing is that all of the durations with
a given starting date are treated equivalently for clearing: for
example, 200 MW of a 3-month product offered in December,
200 MW of a 6-month product offered in December, and 200 MW
of a 12-month product offered in December all count equivalently
toward clearing. That is because each of these contracts has a start
date of January 1st and, consequently, the sale of each of these
contracts puts the same amount of electricity capacity in other
parties’ hands during the ﬁrst quarter of the year. However, to the
extent that the 3-month product is sold, an equivalent quantity will
need to be auctioned again in March; to the extent that the
6-month product is sold, an equivalent quantity will not need to be
auctioned until June; and to the extent that the 12-month product
is sold, an equivalent quantity will not need to be auctioned until
the following December.
The ﬁrst EDF auction was conducted in September 2001; and, as
of this writing, there have been 34 quarterly auctions successfully
held. Meanwhile, the VPP auction has proven popular with regu-
lators throughout Europe. The basic mechanism has been repli-
cated for: Electrabel in Belgium; Nuon in the Netherlands; Elsam in
Denmark; Endesa and Iberdrola, in combined auctions, in Spain;
REN and EDP, in combined auctions, in Portugal; and E.ON and
RWE, in separate voluntary auctions, in Germany. A similar struc-
ture was used in the Texas Capacity Auctions, in the US; and was
planned in connection with the Exelon-PGE merger, in the US.
3 In
addition, the so-called “gas release programme auction” d the
natural gas counterpart of the VPP auction d has been utilized in
Germany, Austria, France, Hungary and Denmark.
In requiring VPP auctions, regulators may be attempting to
further any or all of the following objectives:
  Facilitating entry into the electricity market by assuring the
availability to new entrants of electricity supplies on the high-
power grid;
  Promoting the development of and adding liquidity to the
wholesale electricity market; and
  Reducing market power in the spot electricity market.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes and explores
the various design choices that virtually all VPP auctions have had
in common, while Section 3 focuses on a few aspects of the auction
design that have varied signiﬁcantly among the VPP auctions to
date. Section 4 considers whether VPP auctions have been an
effective tool for promoting each of the pro-competitive objectives
listed above, and Section 5 concludes.
2. Commonalities in the design choices for VPP auctions
Virtually all of the VPP auctions that have been adopted in
practice havemade the same general design choice: a simultaneous
ascending-clock auction with a discrete round structure. In this
section, we describe the simultaneous ascending-clock auction and
we explore the reasons for the unanimous choice.4
2.1. Simultaneous ascending-clock auction with discrete rounds
In the ascending-clock auction with discrete rounds, the
following basic procedure is typically used:
  The auctioneer pre-announces an available supply, S, in the
auction, which may be subject to a reserve price or an
increasing supply curve;
  The auctioneer announces to bidders an interval of prices,
½pt;pt , effective for round t;
  Each bidder i simultaneously and independently submits its
demands qi(p) for prices p˛½pt;pt , during round t, where qi(p)
is constrained to be a downward-sloping demand curve;




  If AD>S, then the aggregate demand AD is disclosed to the
bidders and the auction progresses to round tþ1, in which an
interval of prices ½ptþ1;ptþ1 ,w h e r eptþ1 > ptþ1 ¼ pt,i se f f e c -
tive; and
  If AD S, then the auction concludes at a clearing price of




When the ascending-clock auction involves multiple products,
they are typically auctioned simultaneously. Products may be in
the same product group or in distinct product groups. When
products are in the same product group, it is possible for bidders
to “switch” from one product to another as prices ascend; while
when products are in distinct product groups, they are auctioned
independently (but simultaneously). For example, in many of the
auctions, base-load products of different durations have been
assigned to the same product group, while peak-load and base-
load products have been assigned to different product groups. The
rationale for this grouping has been that base-load products of
different durations are generally viewed as substitutes, while
base-load and peak-load products are generally viewed as
complements. As such, a bidder may wish to shift its demand
among the different base-load products as prices evolve, but
probably will not need to shift its demand between base-load and
peak-load products.
2.2. Dynamic vs. sealed-bid
By contrast, in the standard sealed-bid auction, bidders have
a single opportunity to submit demand curves qi(p) that cover the
entire possible range of prices.5 They do not receive any feedback
about the bids of other bidders until the auction has concluded.
Basedonthe single roundof sealed-bidsubmissions,the auctioneer
determines the clearing price p* to be the smallest p such that P
i˛IqiðpÞ S (or the largest p such that
P
i˛IqiðpÞ S). Each bidder
i wins the quantity qi(p*) and pays either p* per unit (uniform-price
auction) or the amount of its winning bid (pay-as-bid auction),
depending on the exact auction format.
2 Subsequently, a 48-month product has been added to the base-load VPP
product group. Moreover, the September auction has offered additional products: in
addition to the usual array of products with start dates of 1 October (one month
after the auction), there are 2-month, 12-month, 24-month, 36-month and
48-month (base-load only) products with start dates of 1 November (i.e. two
months after the auction).
3 However, the Exelon-PGE merger failed to receive the approval of New Jersey
regulators, and merger efforts were ultimately abandoned.
4 Additional details and discussions relating to dynamic clock auctions may be
found in Ausubel and Cramton (2002, 2004), Ausubel et al. (2002), and Ausubel
(2004). An exploration of the relationship between VPP prices and spot prices in
the French market can be found in Armstrong et al. (2007).
5 Often, in sealed-bid auctions, bidders are permitted to submit multiple bids,
each for a given quantity of electricity and at a given price. The reader should
observe that, when bids of a bidder are expressed in the latter form, they may be
combined together to form an inverse demand curve, and the expression of an
inverse demand curve is almost equivalent to the expression of a demand curve.
Thus, the latter form is almost equivalent to the submission by bidders of demand
curves.
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For virtual power plants, dynamic auction formats offer at least
four decisive advantages over sealed-bid auction formats. First,
dynamic auctions offer the greatest transparency and, by contrast,
sealed-bid auctions are comparatively opaque. Recall that VPP
auctions are frequently invoked as competition remedies for facili-
tating entry into markets with dominant ﬁrms; consequently, it is
important to the credibility and success of the programs for
competitors, regulators and the public to be able to see that the
auctions are conducted fairly and in accordance with the published
rules. The transparency of dynamic auction formats is thus an
importantpropertyfavoringtheiradoptionforVPPauctions.Second,
an ascending-clock auction is a particularly simple and effective
format for obtaining price discovery. Since another frequent objec-
tive of VPP auctions is to jumpstart the development of wholesale
power markets, the promotion of price discovery (which, in turn,
facilitates wholesale power transactions outside the auction) is
anothervaluablefeatureofascending-clockauctions.Third,intrying
to explain why dynamic auctions are growing in popularity relative
to sealed-bid auctions, the literature has observed that bidders will
be reluctant to reveal theirvaluationstruthfully inanauctionwhere
the seller may have the opportunity subsequently to use the infor-
mation against the bidders. By contrast, a dynamic auction avoids
this problem, as it does not require the high-value bidders to reveal
their true valuations d the bidding stops as soon as the aggregate
demand becomes equal to supply. Again, this issue is likely to be
important in VPP auctions, as the seller is a dominant ﬁrm, and the
bidders are potential entrants. Fourth, the ascending-clock auction
format scales particularlywelltoa simultaneousauctionof multiple
products, which are frequently present in VPP auctions. By contrast,
independent sealed-bid auctions perform particularly poorly
when substitutes d for example, base-load products of different
durations d or complements d for example, base-load and peak-
load products d are auctioned together.
Given these advantages, it is not at all surprising that essentially
all virtual power plant auctions to date have utilized some variation
on a simultaneous ascending-clock auction.
2.3. Discrete rounds vs. continuous bidding
Although in theory one can imagine implementing an
ascending-clock auction in continuous time, this is hardly ever
done in practice in auctions of high-valued items. VPP auctions
inevitably use discrete rounds for at least three important reasons.
First, communication is rarely so reliable that bidders would be
willing to be exposed to a continuous clock. A bidder would ﬁnd it
unsatisfactory if the price clock swept past the bidder’s willingness
to pay because of a brief communication glitch. Discrete rounds are
robust to communication problems. Discrete rounds have a bidding
window of signiﬁcant duration, rarely less than ten mintues and
often a half-hour or longer. This window gives bidders time to
correct any communication problems, to resort to back-up systems,
or to contact the auctioneer and have the round extended. Second,
bids need to be legally-binding commitments in order for an
auction process to work as intended. This implies that bidders need
to be given sufﬁcient time to reﬂect upon, carefullyenter, check and
submit their bids, if bidders are going to be held to their bids. Third,
a discrete-round auction also improves price discovery by giving
the bidders an opportunity to reﬂect between rounds. Bidders need
time to incorporate information from prior rounds into a revised
bidding strategy. This updating is precisely one of the sources of
price discovery and its associated beneﬁts.
Itisonlyinsequentialdescendingclockauctions(Dutchauctions)
that a nearly continuous bidding process is used. This is seen in
Dutch ﬂower auctions, many ﬁsh auctions, and US tobacco auctions
since 2003. All of these auctions are conducted on-site (avoiding
communication difﬁculties) and they all involve descending clocks
(reducing the role for price discovery within the auction).
2.4. Divisibility of the product
Given that electricity is nearly a perfectly-divisible good, it is
natural for the auction process to treat it as highly divisible. Thus,
many VPP auctions (e.g. France, Belgium and Denmark) have used
minimumbidding units of 1 MW, in auctionswhereanywhere from
100 to more than 1000 MW of contracts are offered. The initial
Spanish VPP auctions used bidding units of 2 MW d that was
because the auctions were conducted jointly for Endesa and Iber-
drola, and so the minimum bid was 1 MW attributable to each
seller. Later, the bidding unit was raised to 10 MW (5 MW for each
seller). In the E.ON VPP auction, the minimum positive bid was
5 MW, but above that, the bidding unit was 1 MW; the minimum
was only to establish a minimum scale where it would be worth
setting up contractual arrangements with a winner.
2.5. Activity rule
To promote price discovery, activity rules are generally imposed
in ascending-clock auctions. In an ascending-clock auction for
a single product, the prevalent activity rule takes the simple form of
a monotonicity constraint: each bidder’s quantity demanded is not
permitted to increase as the price increases, consistent with
downward-sloping demand curves. Without the monotonicity
constraint, a bidder might hide as a “snake in the grass” d grossly
understating demands at low prices and then jumping inwith large
demands near the end of the auction. Widespread use of a snake-
in-the-grass strategy would undermine the very purpose of
utilizing a dynamic auction.6 A monotonicity constraint prevents
this form of strategic behavior, thus encouraging better price
discovery and facilitating rapid convergence to equilibrium.
In situations with multiple goods that have relatively indepen-
dent demands or are complements, a monotonicity constraint is
often applied independently to each good. However, in situations
where two or more products are close substitutes, applying
monotonicity constraints independently to each good may be
overlyrestrictive; it is natural for thebidder towanttoswitchtothe
product with the more attractive price. This would be excluded by
the simplest application of independent monotonicity constraints.
A common approach is to organize different durations of the
same type of contract into product groups. Since the goods within
a group are denominated in comparable units (MW of power), the
activity rule applied to all products within a group can simply be
a monotonicity constraint on the sum of the demands for the
respective products. This approach was utilized in the French and
Belgian VPP auctions; it permits bidders to substitute among 3-
month, 6-month, and 12-month contracts, etc., on a one-to-one
basis. A variation on this approach has been utilized in the Spanish
auctions: there, contracts of different durations are compared
according to the total number of months, so that there, bidders can
6 One motivation for a bidder to use a “snake-in-the-grass” strategy is to avoid
conveying information to rivals in an environment where bidders exhibit inter-
dependent values. If each bidder’s estimate of value is based in part on rivals’
information, one bidder demanding large quantities might induce her rivals to raise
their value estimates and bid more aggressively. A second motivation for a bidder to
use a snake-in-the-grass strategy arises from budget constraints. The bidder holds
back on bidding for the good she wants most dearly, instead bidding for the goods
her rivals want, in the hopes of exhausting the competitors’ limited budgets. The
bidder then shifts to bidding on her true interests late in the auction, now facing
weakened competition for these goods.
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substitute among 3-month, 6-month and 12-month contracts, on
a 4-to-2-to-1 basis.
2.6. Information disclosure during the auction
In an ascending-clock auction, there are many possible policies
for information disclosure during the auction. With respect to the
level of aggregation or disaggregation of bidders’ demands, one
could disclose the aggregate demand for each product, disclose
each individual bidder’s demands anonymously, or disclose each
individual bidder’s demands identiﬁed by bidder. With respect to
the informationprovided about demandin the priceinterval ½pt;pt ,
one could disclose demand at the end-of-round price pt only, orone
could disclose demand at all prices in the interval ½pt;pt .7
Reporting only the aggregate demand for each product at the
end-of-round price, after each round, has been viewed as striking
a comfortable balance between information useful for price
discovery and information that facilitates collusion. In VPP
auctions, the aggregate demand for a product contains most of the
information needed for price discovery. If, instead, the auctioneer
revealed the individual demands of each bidder, this detailed
information could be used to coordinate reductions in demands at
low prices. For example, the bidders might cooperatively recipro-
cate the quantity reductions of competitors, and attempt to punish
those who do not reciprocate by shifting quantity toward products
most desired by the non-reciprocating bidder. Consequently, in
essentially all VPP auctions, the determination has been made to




is by internet-based software. Gathering the bidders together in
a single location would both be unnecessarily disruptive to partici-
pants,whoseofﬁcesarelocatedacrosswidegeographicregions,and
be unnecessarily conducive to collusion. As such, essentially all VPP
auctions have been conducted online on the Internet.
2.8. Frequency of the auction
Most VPP auctions have been conducted at frequent intervals.
The EDF, Electrabel, Elsam and RWE auctions were all scheduled as
quarterly auctions; while the Texas Capacity Auctions were con-
ducted about ﬁve times per year. The EndesaeIberdrola VPP
auctions were also initially held quarterly, but they were later
changed to be semi-annual auctions.
As devices for facilitating competition in the market of a domi-
nant ﬁrm, frequent VPP auctions are helpful in offering entrants
frequent opportunities to bid for assured supplies within the
market. Entrants can buyelectricitycapacity when theyneed it, and
they can adjust their purchases according to the penetration they
achieve in the market. As devices foradding liquidity tothe forward
market, frequent releases of supply are also useful.
Sellers also often tend to value holding frequent auctions. By
contrast, offering a signiﬁcant fraction of a ﬁrm’s capacity on
a single date subjects the ﬁrm to a signiﬁcant amount of market
risk; sellers tend to prefer spreading out the sales over several
auction dates so as to reduce the risk associated with market
ﬂuctuations. Moreover, there tends to be greater liquidity (and
greater demand by bidders) for products of relatively short dura-
tion (3-month to 24-month contracts), as compared to longer-term
contracts. There also tends to be limited appetite for purchases of
products on a given date, which can easily be exhausted by offering
a large supply of contracts on a one-off basis on a single date. Thus,
sellers ﬁnd frequent auctions much more palatable, which helps to
explain why negotiated settlements with regulators often tend to
include relatively frequent auctions.
However, it should be observed that the implementation of VPP
auctions at frequent intervals sets apart the “virtual” divestiture
from a “physical” divestiture, which would typically be the one-off
sale of the entire useful life of a generating asset on a single date.
This substantive difference between virtual and physical divesti-
tures will be explored further in Section 4.
3. Differences in the design choices for VPP auctions
While essentially all virtual power plant auctions to date have
followed a common basic structure, described in Section 2, there
have also been signiﬁcant differences in the design choices made.
This section considers some of the differences.
3.1. Fixed supplies of one or more duration versus supply ﬂexibility
The VPP auctions to date have taken three divergent approaches
to the durations of VPP contracts. In some (as exempliﬁed by the
French VPP auctions), several different durations with the same
startingdateareofferedineachauction,withtheclearingcondition
based only on the total quantity sold and no preconditions on the
quantities sold of any particular duration. In others (as exempliﬁed
by the Danish VPP auctions), a limited set of durations is offered in
each auction and only a ﬁxed predetermined quantity of each is
sold. And in others, only a single duration is offered in the auction.
In the case of the French auctions (as well as the auctions in
Belgium and Spain), it was recognized that different bidders might
prefer buying different durations. The view taken was that the
regulators’ interest was only in the aggregate ﬂow quantity of VPP
contracts in the hands of parties other than the dominant ﬁrm at
any moment in time, and not in the duration that these contracts
would take. Meanwhile, neither EDF nor the regulators had a reli-
able method for predicting the demands for the various durations
dother than through the auctionitself d and the relativedemands
for the various durations might change from auction to auction,
depending on which bidders choose to participate and their
respective needs. By way of contrast, there existed good method-
ology for developing the “term structure” of relative valuations for
the contracts of various durations that would make the seller
indifferent between selling one duration or another.
Observe that if both the quantities and the relative prices of the
various durations were allowed to be determined endogenously,
then the entire system would be underdetermined. For example,
suppose that it was decided that 500 MW of base-load power
would be sold as 3-month or 12-month contracts, and that no
quantity relationship or price relationship would be imposed on
sales of the two contracts. Then observe that one possible outcome
would be prices p3 and p12 such that 500 MW of the 3-month
contract and 0 MW of the 12-month contract were demanded by
bidders. A second possible outcome would be prices p0
3 and p0
12
such that 250 MW of the 3-month contract and 250 MW of the
12-month contract were demanded. And a third possible outcome
would be prices p00
3 and p00
12 such that 0 MWof the 3-month contract
and 500 MW of the 12-month contract were demanded. Then,
under ordinary demand conditions for substitutes, we would




12 < p12. That is, the auction
7 One could also elect not to disclose any demand information after each round,
other than the fact that aggregate demand exceeds supply and so the auction
remains open. But this would run opposite to the motivation for using an open
dynamic auction, and so this policy of nondisclosure is seldom taken.
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outcome would not be pinned down at all unless the quantities to
be sold of the different durations were pre-speciﬁed or if the price
relationship was pre-speciﬁed.
Since the composition of different durations was intended to be
market driven and since the term structure of prices was reason-
ably well understood, the decision was made that the prices of the
various product durations within a group would be linked together
and would increase in lockstep. (However, the prices associated
with different product groups d base-load versus peak-load d
moveindependentlyof one another.) Before the startof the auction,
and under the supervision of a trustee, the seller determines an
“indifference table” expressing the price differentials (i.e. a yield
curve) amongst the various products within a group that would
make the seller indifferent between selling one product or another.
With two product groups containing six and ﬁve products,
respectively, there are effectively just two degrees of freedom (and
two price “clocks”), although eleven prices in total. The clearing
condition isthenthat the aggregate demandforeachproduct group
is to be no greater than the total supply offered. The auction itself
then determines endogenously the distribution of sales across the
various durations.
Table 1 illustrates the success of this approach by providing the
results, with regard to both quantities and prices of the base-load
products, in the June 2009 EDF auction. The last row of Table 1
shows the indifference table that was used in the auction. Prices
prior tothe ﬁnal round were additive transformations of this curve:
for example, the end-of-round prices of Round 1 were (V17,300
V23,356 V26,611 V29,405 V31,017 V32,506), respectively, for the
six different durations. In general, there may be some minor
concerns that the seller might attempt to manipulate the indiffer-
ence table to its advantage: for example, if the seller believed that
bidders favoring 24-month or 36-month contracts were more
effective competitors than bidders favoring shorter-term contracts,
then the seller might price the longer contracts disadvantageously.
However, apart from the obvious difﬁculties for the seller in
obtaining sufﬁcient information touse such a strategy, making such
manipulation implausible, observe that the results displayed in
Table 1 are strongly suggestive of a fair indifference table. Aggre-
gate demand for each of the six durations was no lower than 8% and
no greater than 26% of the total demand, aggregated over all
durations.
The June 2009 EDF auction also included 556 MW of “advance
sales” of products to be offered in the September auction: ten
products of various durations with starting dates of 1 October or 1
November 2009 (not shown in Table 1). These were similarly
offered with a yield curve of indifference prices; and a positive
quantity of each of these ten products was sold.
In some other series of VPP auctions, multiple durations are
offered to bidders, but only in ﬁxed supplies. Table 2 illustrates the
approach that has been taken in the Danish VPPAuctions. Contracts
of 3-month, 12-month and 36-month durations are offered
according to a planned schedule, in ﬁxed supplies of 100 MW or
200 MW in a given auction.
Meanwhile, in some other VPP auctions (e.g. the Netherlands,
RWE Germany and Portugal auctions), only a single product dura-
tion was generally offered to bidders.
The approach of supply ﬂexibility appears the most desirable,
for three reasons. First, in terms of the objectives of facilitating the
obtaining of supply by new entrants and of increasing the liquidity
of wholesale markets, the extra ﬂexibility is highly desirable. New
entrants are better able to obtain quantities of electricity capacity
over time that match their needs; while new liquidity will gravitate
to durations that are in the greatest need of liquidity in the
wholesale market. Second, value is maximized among sellers and
bidders by offering ﬂexibility in duration: if there are greater gains
from trade at a particular duration, the auction will shift sales
toward that duration. Third, the probability of a product failing to
sell (due to receiving bids less than the supply) is minimized,
improving the likelihood that the regulatory objectives of the VPP
auction program are met.
By the same token, the approach of offering multiple durations,
each in ﬁxed quantities, appears to be superior to offering only
a single duration. Given the heterogeneity of bidders, it is unlikely
that a “one size ﬁts all” contract would meet entrants’ needs or
maximize gains among sellers and bidders. Additional durations
and additional ﬂexibility will generally be beneﬁcial.
3.2. Structure of bid submissions
The VPP auctions to date have also taken three divergent
approaches to the exact structure of bid submissions. In many (for
example, the French, Belgian, Spanish and E.ON German VPP
auctions), bidders are permitted in round t to submit essentially
arbitrary non-increasing step functions of quantities associated
with the interval of prices, ½pt;pt . In some auctions, bidders are
permitted in round t to submit step functions of quantities with
a single reduction in the interval ½pt;pt  (“exit bids”). And in a few
auctions (for example, the Dutch and Danish VPP auctions), bidders
are permitted to submit quantities at only the single price pt, and
the resulting “overshoot” is resolved by having bidders re-bid in
a ﬁnal sealed-bid round.
The approach of having bidders re-bid in a ﬁnal sealed-bid
round generally achieves poor results relative to the objectives of
efﬁciency or revenue maximization. The reasoning is as follows:
suppose a situation where the true clearing price is ½ðpt þ ptÞ, the
midpoint of the interval of prices effective in round t. Then the
auction will attract insufﬁcient demand in round t at the price pt,
and the bids of round t will be re-bid in a ﬁnal sealed-bid round.
Bidders, learning the “bad news” that there was insufﬁcient
demand at pt, will (regardless of their preexisting assessments of
value) tend to bid close to the minimum allowable amount of pt in
the re-bidding. Thus, the contracts will tend to be allocated
randomly among the remaining bidders rather than allocated
efﬁciently to the bidders with the highest valuations, and the
revenue per contract will tend to be approximately pt d unam-
biguously less than ½ðpt þ ptÞ.
By the same token, allowing bidders to submit essentially
arbitrary non-increasing step functions of quantities associated
with the current interval of prices will tend to produce the true
clearing price, with bids dispersed according to the bidders’
underlying valuations rather than clustered at the minimum
possible price. Thus, the design used in France, Belgium, Spain and
for E.ON in Germany tends to produce more efﬁcient and higher
revenue outcomes. Meanwhile, the approach of allowing bidders to
submit step functions of quantities with a single reduction is a part-
way measure that also improves upon the approach of re-bidding
Table 1
Quantity sold and ﬁnal prices in June 2009 EDF VPP auction.
Duration of base-load product 3-Month 6-Month 12-Month 24-Month 36-Month 48-Month Aggregate total
Quantity sold 95 MW 40 MW 70 MW 125 MW 50 MW 100 MW 480 MW
Final price per month V19,500 V25,556 V28,811 V31,605 V33,217 V34,706
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in the ﬁnal round but sacriﬁces some of the efﬁciencyand revenues
achievable using arbitrary step functions.
3.3. Reserve prices
The VPP auctions conducted to date have varied in their reserve-
price policies. The French VPP auctions have not utilized any reserve
price for the base-load and peak-load products, but this was accom-
panied by a conﬁdence that aggregate demand in the auction would
far outstrip the supply.8 Indeed, in the typical EDF auction, there has
been approximately a four-to-one ratio between the aggregate
demandinRoundOneandthesupply.MostoftheotherVPPauctions
haveutilizedsomeformofannouncedorsecretreserveprice,butthis
was accompanied by the recognition that demand in many of the
other markets was much weaker and that the seller needed the
protection of a reserve price in the event of insufﬁcient demand.
An announced reserve price can be implemented very simply in
an ascending-clock auction, by starting the price clock at the
reserve price. A secret reserve price is typically implemented under
the supervision of a trustee or monitor, who assures that the
reserve price has been ﬁxed before the bidding starts. A given
product does not clear until aggregate demand is less than or equal
to the supply and the reserve price is reached. If the aggregate
demand is less than or equal to the supply but the auction remains
open, bidders can infer that the reserve price is the level at which
the auction ultimately closes; but otherwise the “secret reserve”
price stays undisclosed.
Observethatareservepriceisausefulinstrumentforaddressing
limited competition within the auction. It does this in two ways.
First,it reducesthe incentiveforcollusionbylimiting themaximum
gain from collusion. Bidders must pay at least the reserve price no
matter how effective their collusion. Second, an appropriately
chosenreserveprice guaranteesthat the seller receivesa signiﬁcant
fraction of value, even when competition is weak.
A generalization of a reserve price is for the auction to utilize an
increasing supply curve. In a clock auction, a supply adjustment is
most easily accomplished by specifying an explicit upward-sloping
supply curve. This has the effect of expanding the quantity offered
for salewhen there is ample competition, but reducing the quantity
offered (and implicitly introducing a reserve-like mechanism)
when there is insufﬁcient competition within the auction.
3.4. Information disclosure after the auction
The VPP auctions conducted to date have varied substantially in
their post-auction information-disclosure policies. In many (for
example, the French, Belgian and Spanish VPP auctions), the same
information that becomes available to winning bidders during the
auction is also made available to the general public shortlyafter the
auction. The disclosed information includes the prices and aggre-
gate demands for each product after every round, including the
ﬁnal round.In someotherVPPauctions, the only informationthat is
announced publicly is the ﬁnal price and quantity.
A policy of widespread disclosure is preferable for several
reasons. First, it facilitates participation by newentrants, by putting
them on a level playing ﬁeld with past participants. Second, it helps
to assure a high level of transparency in the auctionprocess. Finally,
the disclosure enhances the secondary market.
4. VPP auctions as tools for promoting competition and
liberalization
The most common motivation for virtual power plant auctions
has been to promote competition in and the liberalization of elec-
tricity marketswith one or moredominant ﬁrms. In this section, we
explore and evaluate the possible pro-competitive effects of VPP
auctions. Commentators have suggested at least three mechanisms
bywhichVPPauctionsmaypromotecompetitionandliberalization:
  They may facilitate entry intothe electricity market byassuring
the availability to new entrants of electricity supplies on the
high-power grid;
  They may promote the development of and add liquidity to the
wholesale electricity market; and
  They may reduce market power in the spot electricity market.
The ﬁrst two mechanisms have been foremost in the minds of
regulators and are probably the most important. For example, in the
merger procedure leading up to the EDF auctions, the European
Commission (2001) wrote: “Access to generation capacity in France
would only realistically be possible if EDF granted such access since
EDFisthemaingeneratorinFrance.”(paragraph34).Inassessingthe
competitive situation in 2001, the EC concluded: “Newcomers have
only marginal chances to purchase electricity in the framework of
trading in France” (1.3.2.2); “Newcomers face difﬁculties when
entering the French market via imports” (1.3.2.3); and “The over-
whelming position in electricity generation in France allows EDF to
outbid competitors trying to enter the French market” (1.3.2.4).
In requiring VPP auctions as a quid pro quo for allowing EDF to
take a joint controlling interest in EnBW, the EC believed that the
new auctions would facilitate new entry and competition: “The
access to generation capacity will enable foreign suppliers to
become active on the market for supply to eligible customers to
a signiﬁcant extent.” (paragraph 107). “Furthermore, German
suppliers will also be able to gain a foothold in France and thus
become sufﬁciently strong in France in order to cope with EDF’s
potential for retaliation resulting from its presence in Germany.”
(paragraph 108). “Finally, the access to generation capacity in
France will put foreign suppliers in a better position regarding
Pan-European supply contract since they will be able to supply
customers with eligible production sites in France through a VPP
contract with EDF.” (paragraph 109).
The various VPP auctions appear to have been generally
successful, operating primarily through the ﬁrst two mechanisms.
One important data point is the development of the wholesale
electricity market in France. In 2001, any wholesale electricity
market was close to nonexistent in France d to the point that, for
the setting of reference prices in the early EDF auctions, the price
data was taken from the German wholesale market (the French
data being too thin and lacking in meaning). However, after eight
years of VPP auctions, the French market is now generally consid-
ered to be the third most active electricity wholesale market in
Europe.
Table 2
Quantities offered in Danish VPP auctions, May 2008eNov 2009.
Duration of product offered 3-Month 12-Month 36-Month
Quantity offered in Aug 2008 auction 200 MW 100 MW
Quantity offered in Nov 2008 auction 100 MW 200 MW
Quantity offered in Feb 2009 auction 100 MW
Quantity offered in May 2009 auction 100 MW
Quantity offered in Aug 2009 auction 100 MW 100 MW
Quantity offered in Nov 2009 auction 100 MW 200 MW
8 A reserve price was introduced in the French auctions of 2003e2005 for the
Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) product, after it became clear that the demand
for the PPA product was much lower than for the base-load and peak-load VPP
products. When the PPA product was discontinued in 2006, the reserve price was
also discontinued.
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Various European utilities today view participation in VPP
auctions as an important element of their pan-European strategies.
For example, Iberdrola (itself required to sell in the Spanish VPP
auctions) recently trumpeted the fact that it had successfully
acquired 1500 MWof capacity in 2008 in VPP auctions in Germany,
France and Portugal (Iberdrola, 2009). While European utilities
have been consolidating, their operations outside their principal
markets have been expanding, partly due to the access to capacity
afforded by VPP auctions.
The third mechanism has been emphasized, for example, by
Christian Schultz (2005). Physical or virtual divestitures by domi-
nant ﬁrms have the potential to reduce market power in the spot
market by creating less concentrated market shares in generating
capacity. Schultz argues that VPP auctions, as typically imple-
mented, diminish spot market power much less than is possible,
since the contracts are relatively short-lived (as compared to
physical divestiture) and the auctions are generally frequent.
Schultz would therefore prefer unstaggered VPP contracts of long
duration (or physical divestitures).
Our assessment is that VPP auctions as currently practiced are
not oriented toward making major reductions of concentration
levels in spot markets. VPP contracts are intended to be relatively
long-term contracts, and they are intended to be bought by
competitors of the dominant ﬁrm(s). This means that the demand
for VPP contracts is relatively limited. Consequently, VPP auctions
as currently practiced must involve a relatively small fraction of
electricity capacity in the given market. For example, in France in
2001, EDF accounted for greater than 80% of the overall electricity
market, while the VPP auctions have never sold more than 10% of
total generating capacity. In Spain, Endesa and Iberdrola together
accounted for greater than 60% of the overall electricity market,
while the VPP obligations were less than 6% for Endesa and less
than 5% for Iberdrola (Federico et al., 2008).
Thus, the current magnitudes of electricity assigned to the VPP
auctions are insufﬁcient to have a major impact on concentration
levels in spot markets. Moreover, there may be no practical way to
increase the capacities subject to VPP auctions; even at current
levels of sales, many of the VPP auctions (outside France) have
bumped against the reserve prices.
While VPP auctions are effective devices to enable entrants to
gain footholds in markets with dominant ﬁrms and for developing
wholesale markets, they are thus ill-suited for making major
changes in spot market concentrations. By contrast, forward
markets are effective devices for reducing market power in the spot
electricity market (Ausubel and Cramton, in this issue). More than
anything, what distinguishes the forward auctions useful for cor-
recting the spot market from VPP auctions is that the buyers of
contracts in such forward markets are principally the load (hedging
the spot market), while the buyers of VPP contracts are ideally
competitors (enabling new entry). Note also that, while a VPP
auction obligation is normally placed on a dominant ﬁrm, the
forward trading by suppliers in the envisioned forward market
should extend to all generators.
In the longer term, one could easily imagine the current VPP
auctions enlarging and evolving in the direction of larger auctions
that take on the dual role of facilitating entry by new suppliers and
yielding forward sales from suppliers to load. But, for this to occur,
the regulatory structure will need to evolve in a direction where
suppliers and load are both given incentives or obligations to
engage in forward trading.
5. Conclusion
We have reviewed the structure of virtual power plant auctions
that began in 2001 and have subsequentlyspread widely in use. We
have seen the aspects of the auction design that are common to
essentially all VPP auctions, and we have seen the aspects that
differ among the various auctions. We have also seen that VPP
auctions are effective devices for facilitating new entry into elec-
tricity markets and for developing wholesale markets, while they
have not been oriented toward making substantial reductions of
concentrations in spot markets.
One important reason for evaluating the various mechanisms by
which VPP auctions can promote competition is that it provides
insights into the appropriate duration of VPP contracts and the
appropriate frequency of auctions. If the primary objective was to
equalize market shares in the spot market, then VPPs might be
designed to replicate physical divestitures as closely as possible:
contracts would be extremely long term, and they would be sold in
one-off auctions. However, such timing would be antithetical to the
principal objectives of facilitating new entry and of developing
wholesale markets. Entry would be facilitated only at the time of
the one-off auction; and later arrivals might ﬁnd themselves lack-
ing any mechanism for obtaining capacity. Meanwhile, liquidity
would not be added for those contracts (such as 3-month and 12-
month contracts) that can most plausibly become actively-traded
products in wholesale electricity markets. As such, one can expect
that most VPP contracts offered will continue to be in 3-month to
36-month durations, and that most VPP auctions will continue to
occur quarterly.
Given their success, VPP auctions will deservedly continue to
receive widespread use in electricity markets with dominant ﬁrms.
In the longer term, they could desirably evolve in the direction of
more comprehensive forward trading among suppliers and load.
Such evolutionwill requirechanges inthe regulatorystructure such
that both suppliers and load are given incentives or obligations to
engage in forward trading d without this, an expansion of the
supply offered in today’s auctions would simply cause a collapse in
prices and for reserve prices to become binding. But with such
regulatory evolution, today’s VPP auctions could provide a road
map toward forward auctions where facilitating entry, developing
wholesale markets, and reducing spot market power are all
accomplished.
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